Tracing ISIS’ Weapons Supply Chain

Since the early days of the conflict, CAR has conducted 83 site visits in Iraq to collect weapons data, and Spleeters has participated in nearly every investigation. The result is a detailed database that lists 1,832 weapons and 40,984 pieces of ammunition recovered in Iraq and Syria. CAR describes it as “the most comprehensive ­sample of Islamic State–captured weapons and ammunition to date.”

Threat Modeling For Activists: Tips For Secure Organizing & Activism

At its core, threat modeling is about examining your situation and asking questions. Here are some key questions to ask: What do you want to protect? Who do you want to protect it from? How likely is it that you will need to protect it? What are the likely consequences if you fail? How much trouble are you willing to go through in order to try to prevent those?

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing Adversary Intelligence Operations

Insurgent groups need to secure their operations to ensure effectiveness. This leads them to develop counterintelligence rules and an organizational structure that ensures security. In small groups this may be limited to security-focused rules of conduct, but as groups grow in size and complexity, the need for a more robust security organization is needed. Dr. Turbiville highlights the critical element of security and how insurgent groups ignore it at their peril. Piercing a group’s intelligence capabilities can be critical in undermining its operations. One of the greatest threats to insurgent groups’ internal security is infiltration. Shielding itself from government and military infiltration is a critical element in ensuring an insurgent group’s freedom of operation. Ultimately, this requires the local population to either actively support or passively tolerate the insurgents. The population’s loyalty, a fundamental tenet of irregular warfare, is the objective of both sides fighting in an insurgency.

Multi-Agency Task Force Prepares “Rules of Engagement” For Line 3 Protests

Documents published below for the first time show that state officials have created an incident command structure to rapidly deploy ‘Mobile Response Teams’ (or ‘MRTs’) across each Minnesota State Patrol (MSP) district in Minnesota to quickly confront any protest against the pipeline pipeline. The “Northern Lights Task Force” was created in 2018 ” to coordinate planning, resources and response to the Enbridge Pipeline 3 replacement project.”

Private Mossad for Hire

Psy-Group had more success pitching an operation, code-named Project Butterfly, to wealthy Jewish-American donors. The operation targeted what Psy-Group described as “anti-Israel” activists on American college campuses who supported the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions movement, known as B.D.S. Supporters of B.D.S. see the movement as a way to use nonviolent protest to pressure Israel about its treatment of the Palestinians; detractors say that B.D.S. wrongly singles out Israel as a human-rights offender. B.D.S. is anathema to many ardent supporters of the Israeli government.

In early meetings with donors, in New York, Burstien said that the key to mounting an effective anti-B.D.S. campaign was to make it look as though Israel, and the Jewish-American community, had nothing to do with the effort. The goal of Butterfly, according to a 2017 company document, was to “destabilize and disrupt anti-Israel movements from within.” Psy-Group operatives scoured the Internet, social-media accounts, and the “deep” Web—areas of the Internet not indexed by search engines like Google—for derogatory information about B.D.S. activists. If a student claimed to be a pious Muslim, for example, Psy-Group operatives would look for photographs of him engaging in behavior unacceptable to many pious Muslims, such as drinking alcohol or having an affair. Psy-Group would then release the information online using avatars and Web sites that couldn’t be traced back to the company or its donors.

Organization and community: The determinants of insurgent military effectiveness

Thus, I construct a conception of insurgent military effectiveness capturing distinctions such as insurgents’ (in)ability to keep ceasefires or to control who is targeted by violence as well as a theory arguing that it is not the resources organizations have that determine effectiveness, but how well their organizational structure allows them to leverage those resources. In particular, the theory focuses on both informal structures of social support and formal military structures such as logistics, command and control, and personnel management systems in explaining how some insurgent organizations achieve relatively high levels of military effectiveness and others do not. After using a large-N analysis to demonstrate that structural factors are poor predictors of organizational structure and conflict outcomes, I test the theory with in-depth case studies of groups from Vietnam (1940-1975) and Iraq (2003-2016) using archival documents, interviews, and secondary sources.