2019-01-24

Israel’s tunnel rats” brace for new guerrilla war

Fearing a surge in tunnel and bunker construction by Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Palestinian militants, Israel is training its troops to hunt below ground with robot probes and sniffer dogs.

The Yahalom men were armed with pistols and snub-barreled assault rifles to ease movement through narrow passages. Oxygen masks are an option, should ventilation prove problematic.

Counter Terrain
2019-01-23

From Guerrilla to Maneuver Warfare: A Look at the Taliban’s Growing Combat Capability

What does successful insurgent training entail? Building on the same basic principles of many Western militaries, my research, focusing on organizations in Iraq (2003–present) and Vietnam (1940–1975), finds that successful insurgent training is (1) consistent, (2) realistic, and (3) focused on generating capable small-unit leaders.

Training
2019-01-22

Modern War: Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice

Locals who are not sympathetic to begin with, who cannot be recruited to the cause, are compelled to collaborate just the same by the fear of violence against themselves or their families, readily reinforced by the demonstrative killing of those who insist in refusing to help the resistance: neutrality is not an allowed option. By contrast, the capacity of American armed forces to inflict collective punishments does not extend much beyond curfews and other such restrictions, inconvenient to be sure and perhaps sufficient to impose real hardship, but obviously insufficient to out-terrorize insurgents. Needless to say, this is not a political limitation that Americans would ever want their armed forces to overcome, but it does leave the insurgents in control of the population — the real terrain” of any insurgency.

Counter Strategy
2019-01-21

The economics of insurgency: Thoughts on Idle No More and critical infrastructure

In recent years, Access to Information (ATI) records obtained by journalists reveal a massive state-wide surveillance and hot spot monitoring” operation coordinated between the Department of Indian Affairs, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), local security forces, natural resource and transportation ministries, border agencies, and industry stakeholders. These efforts have been explicitly mobilized to protect critical infrastructure” from Indigenous attack.

Counter Infrastructure
2019-01-20

The Withered Vine: Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece, 1945-1949

An explanation of the failure of the Communist insurgency in Greece between 1945 and 1949, this study provides a striking lesson in what happens to an armed revolutionary movement when it lacks adequate manpower and logistical resources, and is divided against itself on such basic matters as foreign policy and the employment of its military capabilities. During the period of 1945-1949, the Greek Communist Party was split into competing factions, each with its own idea of which course the rebellion should take. The Stalinist faction, led by Secretary-General Nikos Zachariades, was pitted against the more pragmatic nationalist wing led by the commander of the Greek Democratic Army, Markos Vafiades. Shrader provides a detailed examination of the logistical aspects of the war, particularly the impact of political decisions and the aid provided to the Greek Communists by outside supporters on logistics and operations.

Organization Resources
2019-01-19

Logistic Support and Insurgency: Guerrilla Sustainment and Applied Lessons of Soviet Insurgent Warfare

Dr Turbiville posits there is a high correlation between Soviet Union planner’s studies of Soviet partisan operations in World War II and how the USSR sponsored and supported insurgencies throughout the Cold War period. He effectively argues that this mindset constituted the base upon which Soviet and Russian guerrilla operations and support approaches and techniques were developed’ in the 60 years since World War II. Turbiville clearly identifies how the Soviet perspective on the effectiveness of guerrilla operations constituted the most frequent means of shaping the course of military actions in low intensity conflict.’ Implicit in this paradigm is the critical link between Soviet special operations type units and partisan or guerrilla activities.

Organization Resources