2018-12-07

Open Source Insurgency - How to Start

Open source warfare is an organizational method by which a large collection of small, violent, superempowered groups can work together to take on much larger foes (usually hierarchies). It is also a method of organization that can be applied to non-violent struggles. It enables:

  • High rates of innovation.
  • Increased survivability among the participant groups.
  • More frequent attacks and an ability to swarm targets.
Organization Strategy
2018-12-06

Experts: Sniper Attack on PG&E Site Points to Power Grid’s Vulnerability

The attack at the electricity transmission substation — located next to the Metcalf power plant — happened shortly before 2 a.m. on April 16 last year, when one or more individuals took up positions along Coyote Ranch Road and began shooting rounds at the equipment, according to a California Public Utilities Commission report. … they blasted 17 transformers and 6 circuit breakers, and caused $15.4 million in damage

The attackers severed six AT&T fiber optic telecommunication lines in an underground vault, which was covered by a metal lid that was so heavy it would have taken at least two people to lift it, according to sources quoted by The Wall Street Journal. Besides more than 100 fingerprint-free shell casings littering the area, Wellinghoff said his military experts spotted small rock piles by the plant which the attackers might have placed there earlier to mark prime firing positions.

Infrastructure
2018-12-05

Cycle of Insurgency: How the US Military is Expected to Put Down an Insurrection

The American people don’t have to guess how the US military would respond any longer. Two respected academics chose to war game a scenario using the United States Operating Concept (2010) as a guide.

The scenario continues with descriptions of the activities of politicians prior to the military being involved, but the actions of the insurgent” already guarantee a US military victory. In the presented scenario, the insurgents surrender every single advantage they have. They attempt to hold territory, losing the advantages of mobility, surprise, initiative, and unpredictability. Because they are operating openly and in a defined area, they have lost the advantage of camouflage. The battle lines established by the insurgents themselves at the checkpoints negate the benefits of civilian sympathy. They have a unified command structure that reduces unpredictability.

Counter Strategy
2018-12-04

On the Trail of US Funds for IRA

Money supplied by Noraid was sent over to Ireland,” Mr. Hanratty testified in the 1983 Brooklyn gunrunning trial of Gabriel Megahey and Andrew Duggan. At that point, when equipment was to be purchased, a courier then took some of the money that was needed and carried it back to this country.

It was direct triangulation. Money collected here, sent there, and then transported back.”

Resources
2018-12-03

Rebel Insurgency: Without Hope or Method

The Rebel Alliance is going to lose, not because they are outnumbered, but because they have no model on which to base plans for their campaign. There are essentially two kinds of insurgent campaigns: city-out or countryside-in; Leningrad, or Yorktown. The Rebel Alliance is fighting both of them wrongly, and has few chances left before defeat and dissolution.

The First Order, for its part, is not a foreign force; they are fighting a campaign of imperial consolidation (think: the Union side in the US Civil War, or the British side in the Boer Wars or the War of Continental Independence) not a conquest from outside. As such, they fail to seize most of the advantages of supply and maneuver their better trained, better equipped, larger force offers.

Strategy
2018-12-02

Army Is Spending Half a Billion to Train Soldiers to Fight Underground

U.S. Army leaders say the next war will be fought in mega-cities, but the service has embarked on an ambitious effort to prepare most of its combat brigades to fight, not inside, but beneath them.

Late last year, the Army launched an accelerated effort that funnels some $572 million into training and equipping 26 of its 31 active combat brigades to fight in large-scale subterranean facilities that exist beneath dense urban areas around the world.

For this new type of warfare, infantry units will need to know how to effectively navigate, communicate, breach heavy obstacles and attack enemy forces in underground mazes ranging from confined corridors to tunnels as wide as residential streets. Soldiers will need new equipment and training to operate in conditions such as complete darkness, bad air and lack of cover from enemy fire in areas that challenge standard Army communications equipment.

Terrain Training